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ARIZONA WATER LAW: A PARCHED PUBLIC
INTEREST
Janet M. Howe*

Water is an essential and increasingly scarce resource in the west. Such scarcity
has revealed the importance of considering the public interest in allocating water
rights. Many states, including Arizona, apply the doctrine of prior appropriation to
allocate water rights. Arizona, through the Arizona Department of Water Resources,
is statutorily required to review all water allocations with the public interest and
welfare in mind during its initial appropriation of water rights. However, in reality,
the majority of Arizona surface water has already been initially appropriated—
increasing the popularity of severance and transfer agreements to change the use of
water. Arizona’s water rights transfer statute does not explicitly include a public
interest consideration, but allows for objections from “interested persons.” In
Arizona Department of Water Resources v. McClennen, the Arizona Supreme Court
narrowly construed this language in a manner that precludes the Department from
considering the public interest in water rights transfers. This Note considers the
implications of McClennen, and examines litigation and transaction models for
incorporating the public interest back into Arizona water law.
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INTRODUCTION
A 2015 article from the Arizona Daily Star declared that a recent Arizona
Supreme Court water law decision “could pave the way for rich corporations to buy
up water rights and leave communities in the state with no say in the matter.”1
According to the article, this ruling, in the context of a multi-year drought, will
“adversely impact” citizens of Arizona, and local governments will be helpless to
protect them.2 The article was referring to Arizona Department of Water Resources
v. McClennen, in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that Mohave County
(“County”) could not object to Freeport Minerals’ (“Freeport’s”)3 application to
transfer water rights from land within County boundaries. 4
In Arizona, the surface waters of the state belong to the people and are
subject to appropriation—i.e., diversion for beneficial use.5 Those who wish to
appropriate water must submit an application to the Arizona Department of Water
Resources (the “ADWR”).6 Before approving or rejecting the application, the
ADWR must consider the “interests and welfare of the public.”7 If the ADWR finds
that the proposed use for the water is against those interests, “the application shall
be rejected.”8 Importantly, however, most of the surface waters in Arizona and other
western states were appropriated prior to the adoption of a public interest
consideration.9 Yet, after McClennen, the initial appropriation stage is the only time
1.
Howard Fischer, Water Rights Ruling Could Leave Ariz. Communities
Parched, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Nov. 12, 2015, 7:46 PM), http://tucson.com/news/state-andregional/water-rights-ruling-could-leave-ariz-communities-parched/article_ceb612d2-ae9c51f4-bde0-a2a7ce24c64d.html.
2.
Id.
3.
Freeport is headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, and operates five mines in the
state. It is one of the world’s leading producers of copper and other minerals with over 13,300
employees in the United States. Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014:
Hearing on H.R. 4924 Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., Subcomm. of Water & Power, 113th
Cong. 1–2 (2014) (testimony of Francis McAllister, Vice President of Land & Water, Freeport
Minerals Corp.) [hereinafter Freeport Testimony].
4.
360 P.3d 1023, 1029 (Ariz. 2015).
5.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (2012).
6.
Id. § 45-153(A) (2012).
7.
Id.
8.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153(A).
9.
See Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of
Western Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29
NAT. RESOURCES J. 347, 356 (1989) (“The only considerations were the order in which the
applications were made and amount of water available, or potentially available, in the water
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the ADWR can evaluate the proposed use of water against the interests and welfare
of the public.10 This is true even though the ADWR evaluates every application to
sever and transfer a water right, because McClennen prohibits the ADWR from
considering a general public interest during that process. Thus, given the realities of
Arizona water appropriation, the McClennen decision leaves the ADWR without the
ability to consider the public interest except to the extent that the public interest is
represented by an “interested person” as that term is defined in McClennen.
Like other states, Arizona does not clearly define the public interest within
the context of its public interest requirement.11 Broad examples of public interests
in water might include societal considerations like aesthetics, recreation,
environmental protection, public health, economic benefits, and water security. 12
Some of these values are protected by vested water rights, such as instream flow
rights for environmental interests. More general societal considerations often do not
have vested rights. For the purposes of this Note, the public interest is composed of
all public values, independent of a vested water right. In particular, the public
interest contemplates the effect of water uses on the community at large.
After McClennen, alternative mechanisms are necessary to incorporate the
public interest into water transfers. Settlement agreements—multi-stakeholder
agreements entered into to settle water claims—are emerging as alternatives to
litigation in states that use prior appropriation to define water rights. 13 Such
agreements can accommodate diverse parties with various interests in a transactional
environment, avoiding the uncertainties of litigation. 14 These agreements offer
opportunities to negotiate and compromise in the re-allocation of water rights, using
source.”); Lawrence J. Macdonnell, Prior Appropriation: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 228, 235 (2015) (“Despite the warnings . . . and the efforts of people . . . to
insert public considerations into the decision process, states focused on encouraging
development and use of their waters in support of economic growth . . . until well into the
twentieth century. By that time, most rivers had been fully appropriated, and the appropriation
of aquifers was not far behind.”); see also W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & W. STATES WATER
COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST, at viii–ix (2012) [hereinafter W. GOVERNORS’
ASS’N] (recognizing the significance of transfers).
10.
Id.; McClennen, 360 P.3d at 1027.
11.
Michelle Bryan Mudd, Hitching Our Wagon to a Dim Star: Why Outmoded
Water Codes and “Public Interest” Review Can Protect the Public Trust in Water Law,
32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 314 (2013) (“Several state water codes use the phrase ‘public
interest,’ ‘public purpose,’ or ‘public welfare’ without defining the term.”). Cf. Amber L.
Weeks, Note, Defining the Public Interest: Administrative Narrowing and Broadening of the
Public Interest, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 260 (2010) (defining public interest review as a
way “to allocate limited water resources to the uses that society values most.”).
12.
See discussion infra Section II.B.i.
13.
Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 769, 775 (2001) (describing how prior appropriation will need to evolve to
solve water allocation issues by basin or watershed-wide agreements that incorporate public
and private rights); see also W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 42–44 (discussing the
Deschutes Water Alliance a grassroots coalition of stakeholders that works together using
water transfer statues to ensure adequate water resources to Deschutes basin users).
14.
ELIZABETH HARTWELL RICHARDS, OVER-ALLOCATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF
PRIOR APPROPRIATION: WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS AGREEMENTS IN NEW MEXICO, at v
(2008).
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funding, land, and other releases and commitments as bargaining chips.15 Going
forward, these agreements may be the best way to consider the public interest in
Arizona’s water transfers.
Following McClennen, Freeport finalized a “Settlement Agreement” with
a number of parties, including the Department of the Interior, the Arizona Game and
Fish Department, and the Hualapai Tribe that clarified and cemented each party’s
rights to water.16 Public officials lauded the Settlement Agreement as a “win-win”
for Arizona and the County. 17 Indeed, while the Settlement Agreement exhibits the
possible advantages of the settlement process—most notably, the representation of
diverse objectives—it also exhibits the shortcomings—namely, the County did not
participate in the Settlement Agreement negotiations at all.18 The County’s interest
in the water stemmed not from a prior appropriated right, but from a fear that the
transfer would negatively affect the County’s groundwater supply and tax base.
These are public interests that the Settlement Agreement ignored. Therefore, in
considering alternatives that allow the public interest—as a whole—to be addressed,
there may be serious deficits in relying solely on the current settlement process to
accommodate all affected parties.
This Note explores the absence of public interest consideration in Arizona
water transfers through litigation and transactional frameworks. Part I summarizes
Arizona water law governing surface water appropriation and transfer. It then
introduces the Settlement Agreement and lawsuit that serve as a case study for this
Note. Part II looks at the failures of litigation as a means of incorporating the public
interest in Arizona water transfers. It also comments on the potential of relying on
the public trust in Arizona to protect similar interests. Finally, Part III analyzes the
Settlement Agreement as an example of a transactional approach. Part III also
provides recommendations for Arizona to better incorporate the public interest into
the water rights transfer process, specifically through negotiated agreements.
Ultimately, the public interest is “far-ranging, highly discretionary, and responsive
to changing political, economic, and social priorities,”19 and it contemplates the
impact on third parties of water use. After McClennen, however, there is effectively

15.
16.
17.

Id. at vi.
See infra Section III.A.
The Facts on the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act,
CONGRESSMAN PAUL GOSAR (Nov. 12, 2015), http://gosar.house.gov/the-truth-about-billwilliams-water-settlement (claiming that the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement
Act of 2014, 113 Pub. L. No. 223, 128 Stat. 2096 “is about private property rights” and calling
it “a win for all involved, especially Mohave County”).
18.
The County has recently been invited to participate in Phase Two of the water
settlement negotiations. See Press Release, Mohave Cty. Admin., County to Participate in
Water Settlement Negotiations (Jan. 5, 2016) [hereinafter Mohave Cty. Press Release],
http://resources.mohavecounty.us/Repository/PressReleaseDocuments/
PRNonDisclosureed5f2fa7-0f79-4692-970f-03facdecacc6.pdf. Effectively, the negotiations
that resulted in the first Settlement Agreement are Phase One of the settlement process. The
Hualapai Tribe, United States, Freeport, Central Arizona Project, Arizona State Land
Department, ADWR, and Mohave County are parties to the Phase Two negotiations. Id.
19.
Mudd, supra note 11, at 310.
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no place for a consideration of the public interest in litigation. As a result, the
transactional approach may prove to be the best solution.

I. STATUTES, SETTLEMENT, AND SUIT
A. Arizona Water Law
Arizona water law divides water into two categories: surface water and
groundwater.20 The water at issue in McClennen is surface water. Under Arizona
law, surface water is subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation. 21 Prior
appropriation allows an individual or entity to appropriate water rights so long as
the individual puts the water to beneficial use. 22 In this system, water rights are
treated more akin to property rights separate from the land to which the water is
attached.23
An individual or entity that wishes to appropriate water must file an
application with the ADWR.24 The ADWR then considers whether the
appropriation’s “proposed use conflicts with vested rights, is a menace to public
safety, or is against the interests and welfare of the public.”25 If any of these three
conditions are present, the ADWR rejects the application.26 If none of these
conditions are present, the ADWR issues a permit that allows the appropriator to
divert the water to a beneficial use as described in the application.27
Because a vast majority of the surface water in Arizona has been through
the initial appropriation process, new acquisitions involve the transfer of water
rights.28 Water is transferred when there is a “voluntary agreement that results in a
temporary or permanent change in the type, time or place of use of water and/or a
water right.”29 Under Arizona’s transfer statute,30 rights to water may be transferred
subject to the following limitations and conditions: (1) the ADWR director must
approve the transfer;31 (2) the transfer may not affect vested or existing rights to the
20.
Mark A. McGinnis & R. Jeffrey Heilman, Don’t Be Left Out to Dry:
Recognizing and Addressing Water Supply Issues in Arizona Real Estate Transactions,
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 577, 579 (2014).
21.
Id.; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 to -190 (2012 & Supp. 2015)
(stating that Arizona law provides that the surface waters of the state “belong to the public
and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use”). Relevant later in this Note will be the
inadequacy of the arbitrary division between surface water and groundwater; all water is
connected and use of one type of water affects the others. See ROBERT GLENNON, WATER
FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 35–47 (2002)
[hereinafter GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES]; see also Section III.A.
22.
BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 169
(5th ed. 2013).
23.
W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 3.
24.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-152(A) (2012).
25.
Id. § 45-153(A) (2012).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. § 45-153(C) (2012).
28.
W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 7.
29.
Id. at 1.
30.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 (2012).
31.
Id. § 45-172(A)(1).
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use of the water;32 (3) the water rights to be transferred must have been lawfully
appropriated and cannot have been abandoned or forfeited; 33 and (4) the ADWR
must publish a notice stating that “any interested person” may file an objection to
the transfer.34 Notably absent from the transfer statute is explicit language regarding
a public interest or public welfare review.
B. Freeport’s Deal Making
In 1984, the City of Scottsdale bought Planet Ranch35 for $11.4 million as
a backup to dwindling municipal water supplies. 36 After the city realized that
moving water from the property to Scottsdale was impractical, it put the land up for
sale.37 In 2011, the city sold the land to Freeport.38 In exchange, Freeport gave
Scottsdale $10.15 million in cash and 50,000 acre-feet of water from the Salt Water
River Project, worth up to $18 million.39
In the negotiations leading up to its purchase, Freeport filed an application
with the ADWR to sever water rights from Planet Ranch and transfer them to the
Wikieup Wellfield (approximately 70 miles north of Planet Ranch) to support its
32.
Id. § 45-172(A)(2). Also known as the “no injury” rule, it ensures that users to
the stream system are not upset by the actions of other users; this rule creates excessive
transaction costs in litigating water rights transfers. See Mark Squillace, The Water Marketing
Solution, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10800, 10802 (2012).
33.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A)(3) (2012).
34.
Id. § 45-172(A)(7). The statute also contains several limitations and conditions
specifically related to the transfer of rights from irrigation districts, which is beyond the scope
of this Note. See id. § 45-172(A)(4)–(6).
35.
Planet Ranch is the common name describing property in Arizona’s Mohave
and La Paz counties that rests upon the north and south sides of the Bill Williams River. It
encompasses 8,388.73 acres, and it is adjacent to the Bill Williams National Wildlife Refuge.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX B,
37 (2015), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g2000/envdocs/AppendixB.pdf [hereinafter
PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX B].
36.
Michelle Rushlo, In Arizona Water Ranches Serve as Insurance Policy for
Cities, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/mar/29/local/me-33849.
Urban centers across Arizona purchased many “water ranches” in an attempt to secure water
for the future. Robert Lindsey, Arid Farm Areas Grow Apprehensive; Booming Cities Buy up
“Water
Ranches”
in
Southwest,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
16,
1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/16/weekinreview/arid-farm-areas-grow-apprehensivebooming-cities-buy-up-water-ranches-southwest.html. In order to maintain its water rights,
the city leased the land to alfalfa farmers. Peter Corbett, Mining Company Agrees to Acquire
Planet
Ranch,
AZCENTRAL
(Dec.
23,
2011,
5:20
AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/articles/2011/12/21/20111221miningcompany-agrees-acquire-scottsdale-planet-ranch.html; see also, THOMPSON ET AL., supra
note 22, at 170 (discussing the doctrine of abandonment for failure to put water to a beneficial
use).
37.
Corbett, supra note 36.
38.
Id. The company entered into an agreement in 2006 and finalized it in 2011.
See Freeport Testimony, supra note 3, at 2.
39.
Corbett, supra note 36. Per the terms of the agreement, Scottsdale will be able
to use 500 acre-feet of water from the Salt Water River Project annually for the next 100
years, enough to serve 800 households a year. Id.
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Bagdad Mining Complex.40 Three parties with vested water rights immediately
objected to the transfer: (1) the Hualapai Tribe (the “Tribe”);41 (2) the Department
of the Interior on behalf of the Bureau of Land Management and the Fish and
Wildlife Service (collectively, the “DOI”); and (3) the Arizona Game and Fish
Department (“AGFD”). The Tribe objected due to unresolved water claims. 42 The
DOI objected as it possessed water rights in the Bill Williams River basin associated
with ownership of the Bill Williams River National Wildlife Refuge, which was
immediately downstream of Planet Ranch. 43 The Arizona Game and Fish
Department (the “AGFD”) filed an objection pursuant to its water rights to the Bill
Williams River.44
In 2013, the parties decided upon the terms of the Settlement Agreement.45
Freeport agreed to provide the Tribe $1 million to support a study necessary to settle
claims to the Colorado River.46 Freeport also agreed to make a substantial
(unspecified) contribution to the Tribe’s Economic Development Fund.47 Freeport
40.
Freeport Testimony, supra note 3, at 2. Freeport’s Bagdad mining complex is
a large, open-pit copper and molybdenum mine 100 miles northwest of Phoenix. In 2013,
production at the Bagdad mine totaled 216 million pounds of copper and 8 million pounds of
molybdenum. In 2013, it contributed approximately $339.1 million to the Arizona economy.
Id.
41.
The Tribe claims rights to the Bill Williams River. S. 2503, Bill Williams River
Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014: Hearing on H.R. 4924 Before the S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 113th Cong. 1 (2014) (testimony of Michael Black, Director, Bureau of Indian Aff.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
the
Interior)
[hereinafter
BIA
Testimony],
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/xocl/documents/text/idc1-027238.pdf. The DOI objected on
the Tribe’s behalf, but the Tribe’s interests were distinct from those of the BLM and the FWS.
42.
See id.
43.
Id. Such rights are called Federal Reserved Water Rights, and they are the only
kind of water right that is not subject to state water law. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22,
at 1027–31.
44.
PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX B, supra note 35, at 287.
45.
Freeport Testimony, supra note 3, at 3. There are actually two settlement
agreements. The first agreement is the Big Sandy River–Planet Ranch Water Rights
Settlement Agreement, which settled claims of the United States as trustee for the BLM and
FWS, as well as the AGFD. The second agreement is the Hualapai Tribe Bill Williams Water
Rights Settlement Agreement, which settled the claims of the Hualapai Tribe along with the
United States (as trustee for the tribe). Both agreements are enacted by the Bill Williams
Water Rights Settlement Act. Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014, 113
Pub. L. No. 223, 128 Stat. 2096. Congressional action is required to enact all settlement
agreements related to Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012) (invalidating any “purchase,
grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands . . . from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians”
unless that conveyance is “made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution”). See generally United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 336–
38 (9th Cir. 1956) (implying that a conveyance of water is covered by the Non-Intercourse
Act).
46.
Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 § 2(7); BIA
Testimony, supra note 41, at 3.
47.
Id. § 5(d); see also, The Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of
2014: In Support of S.2503 Before the Senate Indian Affs. Comm. 113th Cong. 4–5 (2014)
(testimony
by
Sherry
Counts,
Chairwoman,
Hualapai
Tribe)
http://www.indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/upload/files/7.9.14%20SCIA%20Testimony
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further granted the Tribe a “right of first refusal” to purchase land in Banegas
Ranch.48 In exchange, the Tribe (and the United States as trustee for the Tribe)
agreed to release claims against Freeport for possible injuries to water rights
sustained from Freeport’s diversion of water to the Wikieup Wellfield. 49 The Tribe
also agreed to waive claims against Freeport for water rights in excess of 300 acrefeet on Parcel 3 of the Planet Ranch land.50
For the DOI and AGFD, Freeport agreed to a 50-year lease of 3,400 acres
of private land at Planet Ranch, for the purpose of maintaining a conservation area
under the management of the Arizona Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation
Program (“LCCP”).51 One of the objectives was to move this leased portion to public
ownership for the public benefit. 52 Freeport also agreed to set limits on the extent
and use of the transferred water rights at its historic maximum pumping rate of
10,055 acre-feet per year.53 In return, the DOI released certain water claims, 54 and,
along with the AGFD, dropped their objections to Freeport’s application to transfer
water rights.55 Finally, the enabling act required the terms of the Settlement
Agreement to be finalized by December 15, 2015, otherwise the act would expire.56

%20-%20Sherry%20J.%20Counts%20-%20Hualapai%20Tribe.pdf [hereinafter Hualapai
Tribe Testimony] (stating that the money will go towards securing Colorado River rights).
The Tribe’s Economic Development Fund focuses on expanding economic opportunities
within the Reservation, or in support of the Tribe. See Highlights of the Draft Economic
Development Element of Hualapai Tribe’s Master Plan, GAMYU, Oct. 26, 2012, at 5–7,
http://hualapai-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Gamyu201222.pdf.
48.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PLANET RANCH
LEASE APPENDIX C 32–41 (2015) [hereinafter PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX C],
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g2000/envdocs/AppendixC-Final.pdf;
Hualapai
Tribe
Testimony, supra note 47, at 4 (describing the rights of first refusal Freeport will grant the
Tribe to land in Bandegas Ranch). Banegas Ranch is located within Mohave County, off of
SR 93, and just south of the Wikieup Wellfield. See PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX C,
supra.
49.
Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 § 6(a)(1)(A).
50.
Id. § 6(b)(1)(A).
51.
PLANET RANCH LEASE APPENDIX B, supra note 35, at 164–73; The Facts on
the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note 17. Founded in 1995, the
LCCP program focuses on making use of the Colorado River consistent with the Endangered
Species Act, thereby protecting the habitat and species in the Colorado River Basin. Lower
Colorado Multi-Species Conservation Program, ARIZ. GAME & FISH DEP’T,
http://www.azgfd.gov/w_c/LowerColoradoRiverMulti-speciesConservationPrograms.shtml
(last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
52.
Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 § 2(6).
53.
The Facts on the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note
17; see also Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 § 4(d).
54.
Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014 § 6(C)(1) (noting
that DOI, acting on behalf of the Bureau of Indian Affairs also withdrew claims to claims of
water for two parcels of land owned by allottees or the United States as trustee for the
allottees).
55.
Id. §§ 4(b)(3), 9(a)(3).
56.
Id. § 9(C); Ariz. Dep’t Water Res. v. McClennen, 360 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Ariz.
2015).
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C. Mohave County’s Objections
The Settlement Agreement could not be enacted until the ADWR approved
Freeport’s transfer application.57 Pursuant to Arizona’s transfer statute, the ADWR
published notice of the transfer, and the County submitted objections.58 The County
claimed that Freeport’s transfer of water rights to the Bagdad mine would negatively
affect surface water, groundwater, and the County’s tax revenue.59 Specifically, the
County argued that it was an interested party because the transfer of rights for use
outside the County could negatively affect Colorado River reservoirs and eventually
municipal water supplies when Freeport taps into the area’s groundwater.60 The
County also objected to Freeport’s grant of first refusal rights for land within the
County to the Tribe, because granting the land to the Tribe would remove it from
the County’s tax base.61
Additionally, the County contended that the ADWR should consider its
objection based on the public trust doctrine. 62 One model suggested by the County
was an extension of the public trust doctrine to water rights, similar to California’s
application in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court.63 One requirement for
applying the public trust doctrine is that the waterway be navigable at statehood. 64
Because the Bill Williams River is a tributary to the Colorado River, the County
argued that it should be considered navigable for public trust purposes. 65 While the

57.
McClennen, at 1024–25.
58.
Id. at 1025. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 calls for the ADWR to allow “any
interested person” to file objections to applications for transfer of water rights.
59.
Opening Brief at 2–3, Mohave Cty. v. Ariz. Dep’t Water Res., LC 2014000624-DT (2015) (No. 513) [hereinafter Superior Court Opening Brief].
60.
Id. at 18 (“Mohave County is very concerned that after a 10 year drought,
rampant suburban sprawl, and the Colorado River’s-reservoirs sitting at less than 60%
capacity that diverting this precious resources to another county for mining operations will
have a negative impact on an already strained water supply.”).
61.
Id. at 2–3, 19–20 (“The Settlement Agreements and the Act also include
Freeport’s promise to transfer rights in land to the Tribe. This land is situated in the
jurisdictional boundary of Mohave County . . . .”); see also Hualapai Tribe Testimony, supra
note 47, at 4 (describing the rights of first refusal Freeport will grant the Tribe to land in
Banegas Ranch); Zachary Matson, Mohave County Supervisors to Discuss Planet Ranch
‘Plan B,’ HAVASUNEWS.COM (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.havasunews.com/news/mohavecounty-supervisors-to-discuss-planet-ranch-plan-b/article_a5923d7e-6c91-11e4-8246733296746c8b.html.
62.
Objector Mohave County’s Opening Brief at 7–10, Mohave Cty. v. Ariz. Dep’t
Water
Res.,
LC2014-000624
(No.
14A-SW001-DWR),
http://portal.azoah.com/oedf/documents/14A-SW001-DWR-appeal/14A-SW001-DWR0020.pdf [hereinafter Administrative Opening Brief].
63.
Id.; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718–21 (Cal. 1983)
(finding that the public trust prevented initial diversions (appropriations) of Mono Lake based
on recreation and ecological ends). For a discussion on National Audubon Society and the
public trust doctrine, see infra Section II.B.2.
64.
Ariz. Ctr. for Law in Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166–69 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991).
65.
Superior Court Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 23–25.
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County argued the applicability of the public trust doctrine before the ALJ and
superior court, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision did not consider the argument.
The County’s arguments reflect a greater desire to include considerations
based on public interests and public needs,66 as compared to the ADWR’s treatment
of water as solely a property right.67 Moreover, the County’s objections demonstrate
the significance of the interconnectedness of water supplies.68 According to the
County’s 1995, 2005, and 2015 comprehensive plans, the surface water at issue was
not considered part of the County’s municipal water supply because the water was
committed to other users.69 However, the possibility of Freeport using the water for
the Bagdad mine altered the County’s understanding because, according to the
County, Freeport’s proposed wells would adversely affect groundwater supplies. 70
The ADWR found that the County had no vested rights that would be
affected by the transfer, and that the “ADWR was not authorized to deny the
applications on the grounds that they are against the public interest or might result
in an increased tax burden.”71 The County appealed to an ALJ who affirmed the
ADWR’s decision and held that the County failed to file a legally valid objection

66.
See, e.g., Sammy Roth, Even in Drought, CA Water Rights Politically Toxic,
DESERT
SUN
(Oct.
5,
2015,
9:47
AM),
http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2015/09/30/even-drought-ca-waterrights-politically-toxic/73065384/ (discussing the drive and pitfalls of water law changes in
California); see also discussion supra Section I.A.
67.
See ROBERT GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 316 (2009) [hereinafter GLENNON, UNQUENCHABLE] (“We must begin
to treat water as a valuable, exhaustible public resource. Water is a basic commodity for which
there is no substitute, regardless of price.”).
68.
See GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, supra note 21, at 35–47; see also GLENNON,
UNQUENCHABLE, supra note 67, at 324 (“Although we know from hydrology that surface
water and groundwater are interconnected and that excessive pumping will diminish or
deplete surface flows, the legal rules often allow unrestricted diversions and pumping.”).
69.
See MOHAVE CTY., MOHAVE COUNTY, ARIZONA GENERAL PLAN (2005),
http://legacy.co.mohave.az.us/depts/pnz/forms/Mohave_County_General_Plan.pdf
(identifying the Bill Williams River as one of several tributaries of the Colorado River within
the County but noted that the Bill Williams River did not contribute to County water supplies
as it was committed to other users); see also, MOHAVE CTY., MOHAVE COUNTY, ARIZONA
GENERAL
PLAN
63
(2015),
http://resources.mohavecounty.us/file/PlanningAndZoning/General%20Plan%20Document
%20Update/Final%20BOS%20Approved%202015%20General%20Plan.pdf (stating that
Freeport is the second largest user of water in the County, for its Bagdad mining complex;
but, as the plan noted, the County cannot “prevent, restrict, or otherwise regulate the use or
occupation of land or improvements for . . . mining . . . .”).
70.
Superior Court Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 3. The County was concerned
about its groundwater supplies because it is located outside of an Active Management Area.
Groundwater, unlike surface water, is largely not subjected to limitations on use other than
“the physical supply of groundwater.” McGinnis & Heilman, supra note 20, at 589–90.
(discussing the formation of five active management areas in the state of Arizona, and areas
outside of the active management areas are a largely have “virtually no regulatory
controls . . . imposed on the withdrawal and use of groundwater in such areas”).
71.
Ariz. Dep’t Water Res. v. McClennen, 360 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Ariz. 2015).
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under A.R.S. § 45-172, the Arizona statute governing the transfer of water rights. 72
In addition, “[b]ecause none of the County’s objections were based on the
‘limitations and conditions’ enumerated in A.R.S. § 45-172, the ALJ determined
that [the] ADWR lacked authority to deny Freeport’s application.”73 The County
filed an appeal to the superior court, and in June 2015, the superior court held that
the ADWR’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and
contrary to law.74 The ADWR and Freeport responded with an initial appeal to the
Arizona Court of Appeals; however, given the approaching settlement deadline, the
parties petitioned to transfer the appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court.75 The parties
filed for special action jurisdiction to obtain a final, nonappealable decision by the
settlement deadline.76 The Court accepted the special action jurisdiction and issued
an opinion on November 12, 2015.77

II. FIGHTING FOR RIGHTS
McClennen represents a narrow ruling regarding the interpretation of
A.R.S. § 45-172 and the rights and responsibilities of the ADWR. 78 It is consistent
with prior appropriation and “the concept that water rights, once formed, are
property rights that can be used or transferred by the owner without ongoing
oversight from the ADWR, so long as the use does not infringe on the vested rights
of other water users.”79 However, while McClennen represents a case consistent with
the body of Arizona water law, it also represents a missed opportunity to incorporate
the public interest consideration into A.R.S. § 45-172.
This Part examines how McClennen reflects the limitations of litigating the
public interest and public trust in the context of water transfers. Because
McClennen’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 45-172 forecloses consideration of the
public interest in Arizona water rights transfers, legislative action is required to
reverse McClennen’s effect. The Arizona Legislature could explore how other states
have included the public interest within their water transfer regimes. Alternatively,
litigants may use the public trust doctrine for a basis of their claims. However, there
are unique challenges to using the public trust doctrine to protect societal and
environmental interests.

72.
Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172).
73.
Id.
74.
Id. (stating that the superior court did not explain its reasoning).
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
See Felicia Fonseca, Court Rejects County’s Objection to Water Rights
Transfer,
WASH. TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2015)
(quoting
Robert
Glennon),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/12/court-rejects-countys-objection-towater-rights-tr/.
79.
Wes Strickland, Arizona Supreme Court Clarifies Water Transfer Rules,
PRIVATE WATER LAW BLOG (Nov. 18, 2015), http://privatewaterlaw.com/category/waterplanning/. For a discussion on prior appropriation, see supra Section I.A.
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A. The McClennen Decision
The Arizona Supreme Court considered two questions in McClennen: (1)
whether the ADWR is authorized to consider the public interest when reviewing
applications for the transfer of water rights; and (2) whether the County qualifies as
an “interested person” pursuant to A.R.S. § 45-172.80 The relevant provisions from
A.R.S. § 45-172 at issue in McClennen read, in part:
A. A water right may be severed from the land to which it is
appurtenant . . . and may be transferred for use . . . without losing
priority theretofore established, subject to the following
limitations and conditions:
. . . 7. An application for severance and transfer of a water right
shall be filed with the director. The director shall give notice of
the application by publication . . . in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county or counties in which the watershed or
drainage area is located. The notice shall state that any interested
person may file written objections to the proposed severance and
transfer with the director within thirty days after the last
publication of the notice.81
The County put forth three arguments as to why the ADWR should have
the authorization to consider the public interest when reviewing applications for the
transfer of water rights. First, the County argued that the ADWR could consider the
public interest because the use of the conditional “may” in A.R.S. § 45-172 suggests
that the ADWR is allowed to consider other reasons than those laid out in the statute
when assessing transfer applications.82 Second, the County argued that language
from other Arizona statutes requiring a consideration of the public interest should
inform the court’s interpretation of A.R.S. § 45-172.83 Lastly, the County argued
that this transfer constituted a new appropriation because it involved “a new
location, with different geography, geology, rainfall, and neighbors.”84
The court declined to follow any of these arguments, and instead held that
the ADWR could not consider the public interest when approving or denying an
application for water transfer.85 First, the court noted that the use of “may” in A.R.S.
§ 45-172 only referred to the actual ability of the ADWR to sever and transfer a
water right, and not what the ADWR may consider when performing this action. 86
80.
McClennen, 360 P.3d at 1024.
81.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172 (emphasis added).
82.
McClennen, 360 P.3d at 1026 (“The County notes that § 45-172(A) states that
a water right ‘may be severed . . . and . . . transferred,’ and argues that the use of the
conditional ‘may’ suggests that [the] ADWR has discretion to deny a transfer application for
reasons other than those identified in § 45-172(A).”).
83.
Id. at 1027 (The County pointed to § 45-141(A) which “states that surface
waters ‘belong to the public’”, and the ADWR’s authority under § 45-153(A), which allows
a denial based of appropriation if the proposal would be “against the interests and welfare of
the public . . . .”).
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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Second, the court decided that the other statutes the County referenced applied to
different circumstances, and should not be applied to Freeport’s transfer
application.87 Third, the court established that A.R.S. § 45-172 accommodates water
users going to new locations; therefore, Freeport’s application was not a new
appropriation.88 Additionally, the Court determined that granting or denying a
transfer application was essentially a licensing decision.89 Under A.R.S. § 411030(B), the ADWR cannot base a licensing decision on any consideration except
those that are “specifically authorized by statute.”90 Therefore, the ADWR’s
authority to deny an application for “severance and transfer of water rights is defined
by the ‘limitations of conditions’ set forth in [A.R.S.] § 45-172(A).”91 Because the
County could not link its objections to any of the limitations and considerations
stated in A.R.S. § 45-172, the ADWR did not abuse its discretion, act arbitrarily and
capriciously, or act contrary to law when it refused to consider the County’s
objections before it approved Freeport’s application.92
In regards to whether the County could object as an “interested person”
under A.R.S. § 45-172, the County argued that any “interested person” generally
means any individual or entity having an interest in or concern about the water at
issue.93 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated that such a broad definition
would render the word “interested” meaningless.94 The Court acknowledged that the
phrase “interested person” is ambiguous and not statutorily defined but looked at the
phrase in the context of the larger Title 45 scheme.95 Using this approach, the Court
determined that “any interested person” is most reasonably interpreted as a person
who has an interest that is explicitly protected by A.R.S. § 45-172, or a vested
interest in the water rights.96 The County admitted that it did not have any legal
claims to the water.97 Therefore, the County lacked statutory authority to object to
the transfer.98

87.
Id. For example, the court found that § 45-141 only described water prior to
appropriation, and once appropriated, the water right belongs to the owner, with a possible
reversion to the public. In considering § 45-153, the court determined the public interest
condition only applied to new appropriations, and not transfers. The fact that the legislature
included a public interest consideration specifically in § 45-153, demonstrated to the court,
that the public interest was not meant to be considered for water rights transfers.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 1026 (referencing definition in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1001(12),
(13) (2012 & Supp. 2015)).
90.
Id.
91.
Id. at 1027.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 1028.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. The County used the term “standing” to describe its right to object to
Freeport’s transfer. However, as the court noted, standing is a prudential doctrine used to
determine whether a plaintiff has alleged sufficient injury. The court properly framed this as
a question of statutory authority, not standing. Id.
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B. Litigation’s Limits
1. Public Interest
Consideration of the public interest in western water law has developed
over time. Until the turn of the century, western states valued water mainly for
“mining, manufacturing, irrigated agriculture, domestic uses, and hydropower
generation.”99 When states first began to consider the public interest, courts often
equated the public interest with economic interests. 100 However, in the second half
of the twentieth century public interest considerations began to include public values
such as aesthetics, public recreation, public health, harm to other persons, and loss
of alternate uses of water.101 For example, the District Court of New Mexico denied
a water-rights transfer application because it would have been contrary to the local
cultural interests of northern New Mexicans.102 However, this decision was
overturned on appeal because the district court overbroadly applied public interest
considerations not found in the statute. 103
Statutes requiring water departments to consider the public interest vary
among the western states. Sixteen of eighteen western states require a public interest
consideration in the initial appropriation of water, and ten of these also require a
public interest consideration for a water transfer. 104 Most of these statutes do not
define the public interest, or do so with vague, open-ended factors for water
departments to consider.105 Two core models of the public interest have been applied
99.
Douglas L. Grant, Public Interest Review of Water Right Allocation and
Transfer in the West: Recognition of Public Values, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 681 (1987).
100.
Susanne Hoffman-Dooley, Determining What is in the Public Welfare in
Water Appropriations and Transfers: The Intel Example, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103, 105
(1996) (“Projects which had the potential of scaring away investors or impeding economic
development were considered detrimental to the public interest.”).
101.
Id. at 106–07. It is important to note that this list can vary significantly by
jurisdiction. While many states require consideration of the public interest in their water laws,
few states define public interest beyond the statute’s text. The California Water Code states
that a water transfer can be approved only if it will not affect “fish, wildlife, or other instream
beneficial uses and does not unreasonably affect the overall economy of the area from which
the water is being transferred.” CAL. WATER CODE § 386.
102.
See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 340 (excerpting In re Sleeper, No. RA
84-53(C) (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1985), overruled by 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)); see also
Charles Dumars & Michele Minnis, New Mexico Water Law: Determining Public Welfare
Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 817, 824–26 (1989) (opining that Sleeper
“directly pitted the economic values associated with a new ski development against the
cultural values of a northern New Mexico community”).
103.
Ensenada Land & Water Ass’n v. Reynolds, 760 P.2d 787, 791 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988).
104.
Douglas L. Grant, Two Models of Public Interest Review of Water Allocation
in the West, 91 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 485, 486 (2006); see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-153(A) (“[W]hen the application or proposed use . . . is against the interests and welfare
of the public, the application shall be rejected.”).
105.
Grant, supra note 104, at 486; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (2010)
(including “benefit to the applicant . . . effect of the economic activity . . . effect on fish and
game resources . . . effect on public health, the effect of loss of alternative uses of water that
might be made within a reasonable time . . . harm to other persons . . . ”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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over the years: the maximum benefits model and other laws model.106 The maximum
benefits model permits an agency to maximize the benefits to the community from
a water resource even if it involves using unwritten public policy. 107 The other laws
model allows the water agency to consider the other state laws, but not unwritten
public policies.108
Courts have varied in how they have interpreted statutory public interest
language. For example, in Shokal v. Dunn, the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted
language very broadly, finding that the court’s public interest consideration should
extend beyond the list of factors the legislature placed in the water permit statute.109
In contrast, Arizona has no water law decisions directly defining the public interest
requirement.
The use of water impacts non-vested parties through economic,
environmental, cultural, or supply interests. 110 By incorporating a public interest
requirement into their water laws, western states recognized the need to consider
public interest in allocating the west’s “most valuable resource,” and to address
distributing a finite resource in times of rapid economic growth. 111 As discussed
above, although the initial appropriation statute clearly includes the public interest,
the transfer statute does much of the work in water rights decisions. Therefore, after
McClennen, Arizona water law lacks a functioning public interest consideration for
third parties such as Mohave County.
2. Public Trust
Absent a robust case history to inform the public interest consideration,
Arizona litigants have turned to the public trust doctrine as an alternative mechanism
to achieve similar objectives. The common law public trust doctrine entrusts to the
state, for protection of the public interests, lands affected by the “ebb[s] and flow[s]
of the tides.”112 The doctrine is generally limited to the public’s interest in
navigation, commerce, and fishing on tidal and navigable waters. 113 In Arizona, the
public trust doctrine “holds in trust the beds of all watercourses located in the state
determined to be navigable at statehood.”114 In San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
§ 82a-711(b) (2011) (including “established minimum desirable streamflow requirements”
and “the area, safe yield and recharge rate of the appropriate water supply”).
106.
Grant, supra note 104, at 488.
107.
Id. at 488–89. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §537.170(8)(a) (including “public
recreation, protection of commercial and game fishing and wildlife . . . or any other beneficial
use to which the water may be applied for which it may have a special value to the public”).
108.
Grant, supra note 104, at 489.
109.
707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985); Grant supra note 104, at 502.
110.
See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 23–29.
111.
John F. Klein-Robbenhaar, Balancing Efficiency with Equity: Determining the
Public Welfare in Surface Water Transfers from Acequia Communities, 36 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 37, 47 (1996).
112.
Ariz. Ctr. for Law & Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 161 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991).
113.
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 654.
114.
Sharon Megdal et al., The Forgotten Sector: Arizona Water Law and the
Environment, 1 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 243, 261 (2011).
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Court, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated the Arizona legislature’s attempt to
prohibit courts from considering the public trust doctrine in state water law
adjudications.115 The court reasoned that the applicability of the public trust is a
question for courts, not the legislature.116
Two states have expanded the doctrine to include additional ecological and
societal interests. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the California
Supreme Court expanded public trust to non-navigable tributaries that feed
navigable waterways and to human and environmental uses of the disputed water. 117
The California Supreme Court, as part of this decision, allowed the water resources
department to reconsider water allocation based on the public trust periodically,
rather than only at initial allocation.118
While the public trust doctrine can be powerful, its ability to protect similar
ecological or societal interests in Arizona may be limited. First, the public trust is
predicated on the determination of navigability of the waterway at statehood.119 This
is an expensive and complicated determination, and unlikely to apply to a tributary
like the Bill Williams River unless Arizona adopted an approach similar to that
adopted in California.120 Second, the public trust would need to be expanded to
consider interests outside of the traditional interests of commerce, fishing, and
navigation. This is what happened in California. 121 Currently, Arizona applies a
narrow interpretation of the public trust doctrine.122 While an expanded
interpretation is certainly possible, in light of the narrow McClennen decision and
the conservative political culture of the state, it is difficult to foresee such an
expansion.
As reflected in the discussion of the public interest and public trust, the
court declined the opportunity to remedy the failure to consider the public interest
in the transfer of water rights. As a result of McClennen, the only time the ADWR
may consider the public interest (or claims not rising from a vested right) is at initial
appropriation. Most of the available water in the West—particularly in Arizona—

115.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. Cty. of Maricopa, 972 P.2d
179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); see also Mudd, supra note 11, at 300.
116.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 199.
117.
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719–21 (Cal. 1983).
118.
Id. at 728. Hawaii adopted a similar approach. See In re Water Use Permit
Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 445–46, 448 (Haw. 2000) (discussing
Hawaii’s expanded public trust which encompasses all the water resources of the state and
encompassing a wide range of protections outside navigation, commerce, and fishing).
119.
Megdal et al., supra note 114, at 261.
120.
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 685.
121.
See Tarlock, supra note 13, at 780 (describing National Audubon as a
“blockbuster,” but noting the public trust is “too open-ended, uncertain, and potentially unfair
to serve as an alternative basis for water allocation”).
122.
Megdal et al., supra note 114, at 262 (“Arizona adheres to a minimalist public
trust doctrine—limited to the equal footing doctrine. Arizona owns the beds and banks of
navigable water watercourse to the ordinary high watermark.”) (citations omitted).
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has already been appropriated.123 Therefore, if consideration of public interest is
valued, it will have to manifest in another manner.

III. NEGOTIATING FOR RIGHTS
A growing emphasis is being placed on settlement agreements of water
rights.124 Many water law scholars see the give-and-take around the figurative (or
sometimes literal) table as the appropriate method for incorporating the public
interest into the prior appropriation system. 125 In many ways, as discussed below,
Freeport’s Settlement Agreement represented the balancing of several public
interest concerns held by entities with vested water rights. Mainly, the water needs
of the Hualapai Tribe, economic interests of the state, and environmental interests
of the area. However, by excluding the County, the settlement negotiations failed to
bring all affected parties to the table. As a result, the negotiations may not have
addressed all significant concerns related to the use of the water.
A. Winners and Losers in the Settlement Agreement
Historically, Indian tribes have been seen as disadvantaged parties in the
water appropriation scheme.126 The majority of tribes’ right to water derives from
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision in Winters v. United States, in which the
Court held that the creation of an Indian reservation carried with it a right to water. 127
These rights, known as federally reserved rights, date back to the year a reservation
was first established.128 Indian water rights are a significant consideration for all
Arizona water users. Many tribes in the state hold senior appropriation rights to
bodies of water in Arizona.129
In the Settlement Agreement, the Tribe gained definite water rights from
two nonfederal contributions, 130 providing the Tribe greater water security. Further,
the Tribe received contributions to its economic development fund and funding for
studies related to securing the Tribe’s rights to Colorado River water. Additionally,

123.
Macdonnell, supra note 9, at 235; Michael. J. Pearce, Balancing Competing
Interests: The History of Federal and State Water Laws, in ARIZONA WATER POLICY:
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION 27 (Bonnie G. Colby &
Katharine L. Jacobs eds., 2007).
124.
W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 7.
125.
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 1117–19; Tarlock, supra note 13, at 775
(discussing the need to solve water allocation disputes at a basin or watershed level and noting
that “it will be necessary to deal simultaneously with both private and public claims in ways
other than the simple determination and enforcement of prior rights”).
126.
Macdonnell, supra note 9, at 235.
127.
207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 1026–30.
Brett Walton, In Drying Colorado River Basin, Indian Tribes Are Water Dealmakers, CIRCLE
BLUE (July 1, 2015), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2015/world/in-drying-coloradoriver-basin-indian-tribes-are-water-dealmakers.
128.
Walton, supra note 127.
129.
To prove senior appropriation, a tribe must be able to show usage that predates
Western use. Id. (noting there are twenty-nine recognized tribes in the Colorado River basin).
130.
The Facts on the Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note
17.
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the Tribe received a transfer of land from Freeport. 131 The goal for the Tribe is to
resolve all of its water rights. Yet, major infrastructure challenges, for which
Freeport provided funding, prevent the Tribe from negotiating its rights to the
Colorado River.132 Before the Tribe can finalize those water rights, research into
alternatives for water infrastructure needs to be completed. Accordingly, the Tribe,
along with Freeport and the United States as trustee, committed to future
negotiations to finish a comprehensive settlement of all of the Tribe’s water rights. 133
The Tribe will now attempt to finalize its water rights claims in Phase Two of the
settlement negotiation.134
Environmental interests are also served by the Settlement Agreement. In
advocating for expansion of the public trust, many have pointed to the environmental
value of water and surrounding land.135 “Ecologically the Bill Williams River serves
an important function as a wildlife corridor . . . allow[ing] wildlife to travel across
the desert landscape expanding their range and establishing new territories.”136 The
new leased area provided by the Settlement Agreement will likely serve as a wildlife
area, which would enhance wildlife and habitat conservation.137 This land will serve
a significant role in the LCCP, which was designed to further both hydroelectric
power creation and Endangered Species Act compliance efforts by the state.138
Additionally, by donating land to the conservation efforts, the County will avoid a
“buy and dry” scenario—the buyer abandons land after transferring the water rights,
causing the land to become infested with non-native vegetation that diminishes the
land’s economic and environmental value.139

131.
Superior Court Opening Brief, supra note 59, at 2–3.
132.
BIA Testimony, supra note 41, at 3.
133.
Id.
134.
Mohave Cty. Press Release, supra note 18.
135.
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983);
Megdal et al., supra note 114 passim.
136.
East to West, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE: BILL WILLIAMS RIVER
http://www.fws.gov/refuge/bill_williams_river/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
137.
Zachary Matson, Establishing Access at Planet Ranch Could Take Most of
2015, HAVASUNEWS.COM (Jan. 22 2015) (quoting Arizona Game and Fish Commission
regulations), http://www.havasunews.com/news/establishing-public-access-at-planet-ranchcould-take-most-of/article_74bc54c0-a1fa-11e4-b2b3-c3f1d7d236c7.html.
138.
Brief of the Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. & the Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Joint Petition
for Special Action Filed by the Ariz. Dep’t Water Res. and Freeport Minerals Corp., 10, Ariz.
Dep’t Water Res. v. McClennen, 360 P.3d 1023 (Ariz. 2015) (No. T-15-0002), 2015 WL
5075875 *4–7. (“One of the measures required by the [LCCP] Section 10(a)(1)(B) permit is
the establishment of 8,132 acres of habitat for covered species and perpetual maintenance of
that habitat. . . . [T]ransfer [of] Planet Ranch land . . . is critical to the achievement of this
measure.”).
139.
Squillace, supra note 32, at 10802; Mark Squillace, Water Transfers for a
Changing Climate, 53 NAT. RESOURCES J. 55, 62 (2013) (“[T]he land subject to ‘buy and dry’
practices may become infested with unattractive, opportunistic, non-native weeds that further
diminish the prospects for a vibrant rural economic. It is no wonder then that many people in
rural areas are hostile to water transfers and are often willing to work together to block
transfers or legal reforms that make transfers easier.”).
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In addition, the Settlement Agreement recognizes the economic interests of
Arizona. According to Freeport, the mining business contributes $339.1 million to
Arizona’s economy and sustains nearly 4,000 jobs.140 Moreover, this scheme will
likely encourage tourism and economic development by attracting visitors to the
Planet Ranch space.141
Here, the Settlement Agreement accommodated the interests of entities
with vested water rights. However, the Settlement Agreement left one party out: the
County. For example, the Settlement Agreement does not address the County’s
concerns regarding the Tribe’s right of first refusal to Freeport’s land, which the
County alleged will affect its tax base. 142 The Settlement Agreement does not
include the projected effect of this purchase right. 143 Additionally, the County’s
concerns regarding the interconnectedness of Freeport’s proposed pumped water
and the County’s groundwater supplies were never considered. Freeport agreed to
cap its maximum usage at 10,055 acre-feet per year, which amounts to an overall
reduction in water usage.144 However, there is no indication the reduction will
address the County’s concerns regarding interconnectedness because their concerns
were never fully explained. Groundwater is interconnected, and pumping in some

140.
Freeport Testimony, supra note 3, at 1–2; The Facts on the Bill Williams River
Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note 17.
141.
Matson, supra note 137.
142.
See supra Section I.C (discussing the County’s objections). While
Congressman Paul Gosar, a chief supporter for the Settlement Agreement, did address the
County’s objections over the land rights in a letter to the County supervisors, the letter did
not fully address the County’s concerns over the possible future land loss. See Letter from
Congressman Paul D. Gosar to Mohave County Board of Supervisors (Oct. 3, 2014)
[hereinafter
Letter
from
Congressman
Gosar],
http://gosar.house.gov/sites/gosar.house.gov/files/Congressman%20Gosar%20response%20
to%20Mohave%20Board%20Objections%20on%20H%20R%20%204924.pdf.
143.
When land is transferred to federal Indian tribes and held in allotment by the
U.S. Government, it is no longer part of the County’s taxable basis. See United States v.
Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 (1903). Currently, the land is still owned and undeveloped by
Freeport. The County’s concerns will only arise if Freeport decides to sell the land and the
Tribe exercises its first refusal rights. Congressman Gosar points to another federal scheme
for when a tribe seeks to put land into trust, thereby removing it from the municipal tax base.
The fee-to-trust scheme contains a period of notice and comment from affected local interests.
Therefore, Congressman Gosar stated that the County’s objections to the Tribe’s right of first
refusal were premature. See Letter from Congressman Gosar, supra note 142. This interest
could be considered accommodated on its basic level, but, for the County, this solution to
“wait and see” likely seems too attenuated from the Settlement Agreement and the rights
cemented in the present. The County’s objection still centers on voicing its concerns and
negotiating the rights and responsibilities that will affect land and water within the County’s
boundaries.
144.
Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2014, 113 Pub. L. No.
223, § 4(d), 128 Stat. 2096; Memorandum from the Legislative Attorney to Congressman
Paul Gosar, Congressional Research Service, Bill Williams River Water Rights Settlement
Act of 2014, 8–9 (June 25, 2015), http://gosar.house.gov/sites/gosar.house.gov/files/
Bill%20Williams%20CRS%20Report.pdf; The Facts on the Bill Williams River Water Rights
Settlement Act, supra note 17 (estimating the overall reduction in use from current
entitlements and current uses will net 40,000 acre-feet per year).
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areas can deplete flows in others.145 Therefore, the County’s concerns are not
unfounded.
Both of the County’s concerns demonstrate public interest factors—tax
revenue and groundwater supplies—missing from the Settlement Agreement. To
incorporate the public interest, settling parties must revise current practices to ensure
all affected parties have a chance to participate during settlement negotiations.
B. Future Options for the Public Interest
As reflected in the analysis above, settlement negotiations are about
developing relationships, having conversations, and creating solutions to water
issues.146 But how effective are the agreements if they do not include all affected
parties or resolve all of the public interest issues? How trusted can solutions be if a
government body representing the public interest is not invited to the table?
One option is legislative change. The Arizona legislature could add explicit
language to consider the public interest, and change the “interested party” to any
party that may be affected by a water transfer. Such language could mimic states
like New Mexico, Alaska, and Idaho which specifically designate the factors for
courts to consider when evaluating public interest considerations. 147 The maximum
benefits model would likely better incorporate a comprehensive review of all of the
interested parties, and allow Arizona to move forward with the best practices for
Arizona.148
Another option for Arizona would be to expand the public trust doctrine.
As discussed above, states have expanded their public trust doctrine to better
incorporate the public interest.149 Expanding the public trust doctrine is a far more
difficult task, because it is a constitutional provision, and has been applied so
narrowly in Arizona. Moreover, the alternative approaches to the public trust
doctrine have only been adopted in California and Hawaii.150
Because of the flaws in both litigation models, a better option would be to
expand settlement negotiations into watershed-wide agreements that include all
affected parties. Settlement negotiations are capable of accommodating a multitude
of interests as seen in Freeport’s Settlement Agreement. But before it can be a
replacement for public interest considerations, the transactional model must be
expanded to ensure all affected parties are invited to the table. One method to do so
would encourage basin-wide consent for such agreements. A second would require
holding basin-wide public hearings regarding the water use. 151 Either option could
provide a market-style solution to creating a maximum benefits analysis without
legislative input. One possible challenge for the transactional model is enforcing a
requirement to include all affected parties. However, the County’s inclusion in Phase

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES, supra note 21, at 35–47.
Walton, supra note 127.
See supra Section II.B.
Grant, supra note 104, at 488–89.
See supra Section II.B.1.
THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 22, at 685.
W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, supra note 9, at 63.
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Two of the negotiations suggests relying upon parties to voluntarily invite other
stakeholders is not hopeless.152

CONCLUSION
McClennen is consistent with prior appropriation and Arizona water law.
Nevertheless, it exposes limitations in the appropriation scheme regarding
considerations of the public interest in litigation. As states increasingly rely on water
transfers to secure water rights and initial appropriations decrease, the state will need
to adopt alternative options for considering the public interest in water rights issues.
Many parties look to settlement agreements as a way of balancing all of the
complex interests involved with water rights. While the Settlement Agreement here
incorporated many public considerations, it did not include the pertinent objections
made by the County. Moving forward, efforts should be made to incorporate the
public interest into the transfer process. Changes can also be made to incorporate all
affected parties into settlement agreements, thereby using that process to incorporate
public interest considerations.

152.

See Mohave Cty. Press Release, supra note 18.

